a carregar...

GEMF

Grupo de Estudos Monetários e Financeiros

Estudos do GEMF, N.º 11 de 2013

   

Majority Vote on Educational Standards


Robert Schwager

Georg-August University Göttingen, Germany

Abstract:
The direct democratic choice of an examination standard, i.e., a performance level required to graduate, is evaluated against a utilitarian welfare function. It is shown that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low if the marginal cost of reaching a higher performance reacts more sensitively to ability for high than for low abilities, and if the right tail of the ability distribution is longer than the left tail. Moreover, a high number of agents who choose not to graduate may imply that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low even if these conditions fail.


JEL Classification: 
I21, D72, I28.

Keywords:
examination, school, drop-outs, democracy, median voter.

Download PDF

Download
(262 KB)