Lectures
Titles and Abstracts
(Alphabetical Order)
ANTÓNIO PEDRO MESQUITA
Aristotle on Dialectis and First Principles.
Abstract
In this article, we try to show, against a large consensus, that dialectic is not for Aristotle a method of postulation of first principles of sciences, but only an instrument of defence of the principles common to all of them (ta koina, ta axiomata), in case of an eristic assault.
Four arguments are presented and discussed, always supported by Aristotle’s explicit statements on this matter.
CHRISTOF RAPP
Aristotle’s ‘Topics’ and ‘Rhetoric’ as Building Blocks of a Unified Argumentation Theory?
Abstract
Although Aristotle’s "Topics" primarily focuses on a quite specific type of discourse, namely the dialectical examination of philosophical theses on the basis of accepted or acceptable premises, it also lays bare some core concepts of any theory of argumentation. Not surprisingly, it is, according to Aristotle, the dialectician who is competent to deal with all sorts of the syllogismos. This competence for the syllogismos, i.e. the deductive argument in general, brings the dialectician close to what we would call a logician. Still, the theory that is partly unfolded and partly implied in the "Topics" includes more than just the consideration of the validity of arguments; for example, the "Topics" also displays a vital interest in the construction of premises and in their acceptability. When it comes to the Rhetoric Aristotle is keen to emphasise the affinity of rhetoric and dialectic, and it turns out, indeed, that his account of the persuasive includes the notion of what is deductively valid as a proper part. However, Aristotle is aware that the valid and the persuasive do not completely converge: On the one hand, there are also invalid arguments which seem to be persuasive, on the other hand, for the purpose of persuasion in a public context it is not enough the formulate valid arguments; one must also select certain appropriate premises, which seem to be a subset, of what the dialect defines as “being accepted”.
The paper explores the possibility of using ingredients like these as building blocks of a unified argumentation theory.
ERIK C. W. KRABBE
Topical Roots of Formal Dialectic.
Abstract
Formal dialectic has its roots in ancient dialectic, in particular in the eighth book of Aristotle’s "Topics" and his "Sophistical Refutations". We can trace this influence in Charles Hamblin’s introduction of formal dialectic as a means to overcome the insufficiency of formal logic for the study of fallacies. Earlier, Paul Lorenzen proposed a formal dialectic avant la lettre when he stressed the need for a dialogical logic with roles such as the Greek Questioner and Answerer. The influence is also apparent in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s rules of the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure (which may partly be reconstructed as a formal dialectical system). When discussing these cases and drawing comparisons, we shall pay attention to similarities as well as to differences.
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
In what Sense do Modern Argumentation Theories relate to Aristotle? The Case of Pragma-dialectics.
Abstract
Leaving the authoritative interpretation of Aristotle’s works to antique philosophers, classical scholars and philologists, I concentrate in this paper on the way in which Aristotle’s views concerning argumentation have been received and used by modern argumentation theorists. This means that I turn to argumentation scholars who, no doubt, in their turn rely on more authoritative interpreters. Some years ago, together with my late colleague Peter Houtlosser, I have made an overview of the various ways in which the views about argumentation theory propounded by modern argumentation theorists interested in the historical background of their approaches relate to classical dialectic and rhetoric, in particular to Aristotle’s conception of these two disciplines. In my paper I will return to this inventory. I want to focus in particular on the relationship with Aristotle’s views about dialectic and rhetoric of the modern theory of argumentation I am most familiar with, pragma-dialectics.
PIETER SJOERD HASPER
The Ingrediants of Aristotelian Dialectic.
Abstract
I propose that Aristotle distinguishes between two types of conditions for a successful dialectical discussion. On the one hand, there are the rules constitutive of a proper dialectical, as opposed to an eristic, discussion; infringements of these rules - which are thus limited - constitute fallacies. It is therefore one of the purposes of Aristotle's theory of fallacy to bring out these constitutive rules. On the other hand, there are the dialectical instruments, such as topoi, reputable opinions and induction, to be employed virtuously by the dialectician.
TIM WAGNER
Is Aristotle's theory of argumentation (part of) a general theory of persuasion?
Abstract
The question whether an argument is valid and sound is not the only interest Aristotle has within the treatises on rhetoric and dialectic. Of similar importance is the question whether the addressee is able and ready to accept the premisses and to understand that a certain conclusion follows from them. "Rhetoric" and "Topics" therefore contain elements of a theory of argumentation which takes into account the horizon of the addressee – be it the hearer of a speech or the partner of a dialectical intercourse. The "Rhetoric" regards furthermore phenomena which belong to the field of persuasion and can be called 'means of persuasion' (pisteis) but are distinguished from arguments: the person of the speaker and the emotional disposition of the hearer. The talk focuses on the systematic position of these means of persuasion. Is it possible to reconstruct them as (informal) arguments or are they part of a broader theory of persuasion which integrates non-argumentative factors?