

Nicolas Lori
Investigador em Neurociências
IBILI, Universidade de Coimbra, PT
nflori@fmed.uc.pt, nicolas.lori@gmail.com

Paulo Jesus
Investigador em Filosofia
CFUL, Faculdade de Letras, Universidade de Lisboa, PT
paulorenatus@gmail.com

The pragmatist notion of truth, as defended by W. James (see, namely, *The Meaning of Truth*, "Novelty and the infinite", in *Some Problems of Philosophy*, *A World of Pure Experience*), relies on a procedural view of cognition and on a fundamental principle of continuity (made out of continuous transitions and a sense of fulfillment at which culminates every unified series of transitions). Thus, naturalism, radical empiricism and panpsychism intertwine in a complex way to give rise to our (human) commonality of experience in general and experience of truth in particular. Now, by contrasting the Jamesian conception of truth with the Whiteheadian meta-categories of "process" and "superject", one may assess the robustness of the ontological foundations of pragmatism. Our working hypothesis maintains that a pragmatist account of truth and nature seems to be fundamentally accurate but constitutes an exaggeration of the epistemological power and function of a subjective cognizer. The process overcomes the procedure and locates the symbolic life of truth in the vital articulations of a broader organism of meaning-production.