

THREE NOTES ON AESCHYLUS, *PROM. VINCT.*

(1) ll. 397-410.

στένω σε τᾶς οὐ-		[στρ. α
λομένας τύχας, Προμηθεῦ·		
δακρυσίστακτον [δ'] ἅπ' ὅσσω		
ῥαδινῶν λειβομένα ῥέος παρειὰν	400	
νοτίοις ἔτεγξα παγαῖς·		

πρόπασα δ' ἤδη	406	[ἀντ. α
στονόεν λέλακε χώρα,		
μεγαλοσχήμενά τ' ἀρχαι-		
οπρεπῇ στένουσι τὰν σὰν		
ξυνομαιμόνων τε τιμάν·	410	

399 δ' del. Tri. ... 400 ῥαδινῶν M Tri.: ῥαδινόν et ῥαδινῶν
rell.: ῥαδινὰν Wil. λειβομένα del. Tri.: vid. ad v. 408 ... 408-409 post
ἀρχαιοπρεπῇ add. θ' ἐσπέριοι Wecklein, τ' ἐσχατιαὶ Weil: vid. ad v. 400.

So the relevant part of the Oxford text (Murray) and of its app. crit. Whatever we take the metre to be, it is clear that, in order to secure corresponson, either (1) a choriamb (presumably λειβομένα, see app. crit.) must be removed from the strophe, or (2) one added to the antistrophe.

At first sight (2) seems definitely preferable, for (a) the text as it stands is (*pace* Wilamowitz) untranslatable without λειβομένα. τέγγειν παρειὰν is of course all right and so is τ. ῥέος (see Jebb on S. *Trach.* 848, and add to his examples Pi. N. 10.75 τ. δάκρυα); but I cannot believe in the *double* accusative: (b) the verb στένουσι lacks a subject.

To take (b) first, it is just possible to understand «all men» from πρόπασα χώρα; but there is also a hopeful-looking variant, στένουσα, in Q² Tri (so Wilamowitz's app. crit.).

As to (a), we can take Heath's ἔτεγξε, supported by several of the codd. dett. This is a very attractive suggestion, for we can easily see how a careless scribe with his eye on στένω would change ἔτεγξε to a first person verb, whereupon an unmetrically-minded one would add λειβομένα to govern the (then) accusative ῥέος and so give a construction.

Returning to (b): if we accept στένουσα we need no second subject. The only difficulty then is the τε after μεγαλοσχήμονα. If, by those who keep λειβομένα, a subject is supplied to στένουσι, this τε joins the two sentences, λέλακε χώρα and, e.g., ἐσπέριοι στένουσι; otherwise it is ungrammatical. If we read στένουσα this difficulty could be obviated by the change of τ to κ, reading μεγαλοσχήμονα κάρχαιο-πρεπῆ.

A strong argument against the emendations of both Wecklein and Weil is that, while the τε after μεγαλοσχήμονα joins the verbs λέλακε and στένουσι, that introduced after ἀρχαιοπρεπῆ joins that adjective to μεγαλοσχήμονα. Surely an intolerable ambiguity.

I cannot resist the temptation to express surprise at editors' treatment of ῥαδινῶν. ῥαδινός means «slender», and in classical Greek nothing but «slender». ῥ. ὄσσων is therefore absurd, and Wilamowitz's ῥ. παρειάν little better. True, ῥ. ῥέος makes sense; but surely the chorus would not say that they emitted a slender trickle of tears; they would claim to weep copiously. Nearly a century ago Weil proposed δ' ἄδινόν (cf. S. Trach. 848 ἄδινῶν ... δακρύων); but as far as I know this excellent suggestion has never received even the cold hospitality of an apparatus criticus.

It will be noticed that this emendation solves also the difficulty of the unmetrical δακρυσίστακτον δ'. Postponed δέ is common enough in Aeschylus. Denniston (*Gk. Particles*², pp. 187, 8) cites many instances and remarks, «Aeschylus was clearly far laxer than Sophocles or Euripides in this matter».

(2) II. 790-792

ὅταν περάσῃς ῥεῖθρον ἠπειροῖν ὄρον,
πρὸς ἀντολὰς φλογῶπας ἡλιοστιβεῖς
πόντον περῶσα γλοῖσβον...

So the MSS — with the variant πόντον in M and Tri.

Prometheus here continues Io's itinerary, broken off at l. 735. There she was told (l. 731) that she must cross the Cimmerian Bosphorus and so leave Europe for Asia. Here she is told that when she has crossed the *ῥεῖθρον* which divides the two continents she is to journey eastwards. Now things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. As, therefore, both the Cimmerian Bosphorus and the *ῥεῖθρον* equal the boundary between Europe and Asia, the *ῥεῖθρον* is the C. Bosphorus. This looks too obvious for mention; nor would it be mentioned here but for the fact that many of the older editors (e. g. Paley), foolishly misled by a foolish scholiast, equated the *ῥεῖθρον* with the Tanais or some other river; and it is important in view of what follows to be clear about Io's exact position.

The real and obvious difficulty about this passage is its lack of a main verb. We need an imperative or a second person future, «go!» or «you will go». Professor G. Thomson in his edition accepts the Mss. reading, adding in a note that this lack of a principal verb is «not unnatural in a rhetorical passage of this kind». This view is not likely to commend itself to many scholars. A more reasonable theory is that a line has, or some lines have, fallen out after l. 791, and many editors accept this. (Paley tried to insert frag. 195 (O. C. T.) at this point with disastrous results). It is, however, somewhat unsatisfactory to postulate a lacuna unless one is driven to it, and moreover the lacuna would have to be a very long one to get over the difficulty — to be discussed later — of *περῶσα*. It is best to assume corruption and emend, as most modern editors do.

Hartung's emendation, *ἡλὶον στιβεῖ* (imperative of *στιβεῖν*), is objectionable on two counts: (1) it destroys the typically Aeschylean compound *ἡλιοστιβεῖς* and leaves us under the necessity of ascribing this beautiful epithet to a clerical error; 2) *στιβεῖν* does not give the right meaning. That this verb occurs only once in Greek literature is in no way against it; but if we look at the passage in which it occurs (S. *Ai.* 874) we shall see what it really means. The chorus in two bands has gone in search of Ajax and returns to announce its failure to find him. The leader of one band reports *πᾶν ἐστιβῆται πλευρὸν ἔσπερον νεῶν*, «all the westward side of the ships has been *paced*». *στιβεῖν* (*lustrare*) could be used of a man walking about looking for a lost golf-ball: not of Io setting out on a long journey.

Sikes and Willson, in their edition, give *πέρα σύ* for *περῶσα*. Now whether we accept this suggestion or, like Thomson, keep *περῶσα*, we

are up against a great difficulty. *What* stormy sea is Io to cross? Not the Caspian, for Prometheus would be bound to mention it by name; and not the Euxine, for she has just crossed a part of it. She would naturally continue her journey *by land*. The authors of the emendation obviously feel the difficulty which they try to meet by urging that «in the original form of the legend Io was completely metamorphosed into a cow, which, like Europa's bull, might easily be thought to swim a long distance».

May be; but if a woman (or a cow) wished to get from London to Dieppe she would not cross from Dover to Calais and then swim along the coast to her destination. Hemisioeth also saw the difficulty and proposed — reading *στίβει — παρεῖσα*, a suggestion accepted by both Wilamowitz and Murray (*). The meaning is supposed to be «passing by», «passing along, or parallel to, the coast of», and this is just the meaning we want. But *παρήμι τι* means *not* «to pass by something», but «to let something pass by». A good example may be seen at *S. El.* 732, 3, where the Athenian driver in the chariot-race is described as *παρεῖς / κλύδων' ἔφιππον*, i.e. «letting the wave of chariots pass him». The verb meaning to «pass by», «pass along», «skirt» is *πάρειμι*.

It is used several times by Thucydides of an army marching along a coast off which its accompanying fleet is sailing; e.g. 8. 16. 1., *ἐκ δὲ τῆς Χίου ... ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς ... ἐπέπλει, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα ... παρήει*. We could, then, read *πάρει σὺ*. Not less in conformity with the *ductus literarum*, and avoiding the unnecessary *σὺ*, we might read *πάρεισθα*. This epic form, used in several passages in Homer, e.g. *εἴσθα* (K 450), *ἔξεισθα* (v 179), might be employed by Aeschylus in a play which contains, according at least to the MSS., so many epic usages; and, if used, it might well confuse a scribe.

(3) Il. 975-988.

In this passage Hermes is trying to make Prometheus divulge his secret.

In l. 985 *ὀφείλω* may have (1) a causal, or (2) a conditional sense; i.e. P. may mean (1) «since I do indeed owe Zeus a debt <for his ill-treatment of me>, I would fain repay it», or (2) «if I really owed

(*) I understand from Dr. Murray that in his forthcoming new edition he is abandoning this.

Zeus anything, I would repay it <—but I do not, so I will not answer>». (1) is a sinister remark, almost a threat; (2) is a plain statement of conditioned fact. Neither is a sneer, and neither, though addressed to Hermes, is aimed at him. Yet H. continues (l. 986), «you sneer at me as though I were a *παῖς*». At l. 983 P. did indeed sneer at H. as being a *ὑπηρέτης*. Surely, then, l. 986 should come in after l. 983. (*ἔκερτόμηνσας* is the idiomatic aorist of the immediate past, like *ἔθώνξας* (393), *ἔτεγξα* (401), *ἀπέπτυσσα* (1070), etc.. It could not mean «<two lines back> you sneered at me»). In this case, and indeed in any case, *παῖς* means «a slave», not «a child» (Loeb ed.), «un enfant» (Budé ed.), and l. 986 must, as it does in the MSS., immediately precede l. 987, where P. catches up the word *παῖς* but uses it as=«child»—a typical Aeschylean pun. If this view is right, then a place must be found for ll. 984, 5. They would come in well after l. 976, but perhaps better after l. 978.

Brasenose College, Oxford.

MAURICE PLATNAUER