/ Atividades / ROADS TO CARE 2022

Abstracts

2nd Roads to Care

IEF - Institute for Philosophical Studies

FLUC - Faculty of Arts and Humanities (University of Coimbra)

Formal lectures


Estelle Ferrarese, Lazare Benaroyo, María Grace Salamanca,

Marília Rosado Carrilho, & Teresa Toldy

The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas’

Philosophy for an Ethics of Care


Lazare Benaroyo


Lazare.Benaroyo@unil.ch

At a time when advanced technology tends to compromise the primacy of the moral commitment of the health caregiver in the face of the call for help of a suffering human being, it is essential to revitalize the ethical dimensions of care to give meaning to the moral responsibilities that inhabit it. This contribution seeks to meet this challenge by drawing on Emmanuel Levinas’ conception of ethical responsibility. In Levinas’ view, ethical responsibility is the response to the interpellation of the other’s face, which grounds ethical relation. Against this background, I suggest that Levinas’ insight may bear great significance to a renewed understanding of an ethics of medical care.


Lazare Benaroyo studied medicine at the University of Lausanne and received his MD from the University of Basel. After practicing medicine for several years, he completed a post-doctoral training in the history, philosophy and ethics of science and medicine at Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University and Georgetown University (USA), and then at the Free University of Amsterdam (NL), where he obtained a PhD in Ethics and philosophy of medicine. He was then appointed Professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Medicine at the Faculty of Biology and Medicine, and President of the Interdisciplinary Ethics Platform of the University of Lausanne (Ethos-UNIL), as well as Chief Physician of the Clinical Ethics Unit of the University Hospital of Lausanne. Since 2018, he is professor emeritus and a member of the Interdisciplinary Research Center in Ethics at this University (www.unil.ch/cire). He was a visiting professor at the Department of Philosophy of the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS) in Paris in 2012, and at the Faculties of Medicine and Law at Laval University in Quebec (Canada) in 2017. Among his publications* his major books include Éthique et responsabilité en médecine (Geneva, Médecine et Hygiène, 2006), La philosophie du soin. Ethique, médecine et société (co-edited, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2010); Les classiques du soin (co-edited, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2015); and Chemins de l'in(ter)disciplinarité. Connaissance, corps, langage (co-edited, Louvain-la-Neuve, Academia, L'Harmattan 2019). His latest book, Soin et bioéthique. Réinventer la clinique (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France), was published in May 2021. His research focuses on the philosophy of care. His work mainly explores the significance of Emmanuel Levinas' thought for an ethics of care. *Publications (non-exhaustive list): https://applicationspub.unil.ch/interpub/noauth/php/Un/UnPers.php?PerNum=22439&LanCode=8&menu=pub

Le care et le Marché.

Une consommation soucieuse

des autres est-elle possible ?


Estelle Ferrarese


estelle.ferrarese@u-picardie.fr

Une marque de cosmétiques annonce sur l’emballage de ses produits qu’ils sont « 100% paraben and cruelty free ». Des manuels de marketing s’inquiètent du calcul d’utilité et des informations disponibles qui amènent le consommateur à choisir une marchandise produite dans des conditions équitables. Une pandémie convainc les habitants des grandes villes de se procurer des produits « locaux » dans des « petits » commerces. Une pluralité de pratiques de consommation, telles que payer un « juste » prix, s’abstenir de certains types d’achats, acquérir au contraire certaines marchandises parce qu’elles respecteraient des normes éthiques relatives aux êtres humains ou à la nature dans le mode de production, dessinent de nouvelles manières de se relater au marché et aux marchandises. Elles en sont même venues à constituer un régime d’évidence dans les discours politiques et les interpellations des réseaux sociaux.

Dans leur diversité, toutes ces pratiques et les structures dans lesquelles elles se sédimentent visent à injecter des normes, des règles ou des gestes moraux dans les échanges marchands, posés comme en étant vidés par le capitalisme contemporain. En d’autres termes, plus que par une pratique particulière, plus que par une forme organisationnelle précise, ce mode de consommation se définit par l’intention qui l’anime. Il me paraît que c’est le souci des autres témoigné dans l’achat, ou supposé y être, qui est la marque de la consommation éthique. Se relater à autrui par le biais des marchandises n’exclurait pas mais au contraire exigerait une attention aux besoins et aux souffrances d’autrui couplée à une injonction ressentie à y répondre. Il importe de s’inquiéter des effets de ses gestes dans l’échange, et de s’efforcer de maîtriser ces effets, en tout le cas de les diriger dans une direction particulière. Mais quelle est la forme du monde qui résulte de ce souci des autres exercé sur le marché ?


Estelle Ferrarese est professeure de philosophie morale et politique à l'université Picardie-Jules-Verne (France). Elle est membre Senior de l'Institut Universitaire de France. Elle a été Visiting Professor à la New School for Social Research de New York, boursière de la Fondation Alexander von Humboldt à la Humboldt Universität de Berlin, et chargée de recherche au Centre Franco-Allemand de Recherche en Sciences Sociales Marc-Bloch, à Berlin. Ses livres comprennent : Vulnerability and Critical Theory, Boston/ Leiden, Brill, 2018, La fragilité du souci des autres. Adorno et le care, Lyon, ENS éditions, 2018 (eng translation: Adorno and the Fragility of Caring for Others, Edinburgh University Press, 2020), Ethique et politique de l'espace public. Habermas et la discussion, Paris, Vrin, 2015. Elle est aussi l'auteur de nombreux articles sur la Théorie critique, sur les formes de vie, et sur la vulnérabilité comme catégorie politique.

A fundamentação filosófica de um

pensamento holístico e humanista


Marília Rosado Carrilho


marrylia@gmail.com

Cuidar o futuro resume a proposta de um novo paradigma para as sociedades científico-tecnológicas dos séculos XX e XXI, defendido por Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo. Este lema assenta na defesa de que a filosofia fornece os critérios de pensamento essenciais para a definição do desejável.

Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo encontrou a conceptualização das suas intuições em pensadores como Hannah Arendt, Carol Gilligan, Alain Touraine, Emmanuel Lévinas, entre outros. Esta ética global que defendeu teve como pilares os conceitos de cuidado e de responsabilidade, o primeiro herdado de Martin Heidegger e o segundo de Hans Jonas.


Marília Manuel Rosado Carrilho nasceu em 1980 e é natural de Marvão. É professora do ensino secundário desde 2004 e formadora certificada pelo Conselho Científico-Pedagógico da Formação Contínua para as áreas da Filosofia, Filosofia para crianças e Educação para a Cidadania desde 2015. Licenciou-se em Filosofia pela Universidade de Évora em 2002. Durante a licenciatura participou no programa Erasmus na Faculdade de Filosofia e Letras da Universidade de Liège, Bélgica. Nos anos de 2014 e 2015 foi embaixadora do projeto LED on Values, da Universidade dos Valores, tendo dinamizado formações e ações de sensibilização sobre “Educação para Valores e Ética pela Prática Desportiva”. Doutorou-se em Filosofia pela Universidade de Évora em 2015 com a tese "A fundamentação filosófica das noções de cuidado e de responsabilidade no pensamento de Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo. A herança de Martin Heidegger e Hans Jonas". Atualmente, é colaboradora do Praxis – Centro de Filosofia, Política e Cultura da Universidade da Beira Interior e Universidade de Évora e é membro do Centro de Filosofia e Género da Sociedade Portuguesa de Filosofia. Tem como áreas de interesse a ética, as questões de género e o pensamento crítico.

Dancing on the Edge of the Abyss


Teresa Toldy


toldy@ufp.edu.pt

Kristen Dunphy’s presentation of TV series “Wakefield” (2020) includes a sentence decisive for my presentation: “There’s a fine line between sanity and madness”. Every and each chapter of this series starts with a psych nurse standing at the edge of an abyss in the Australian Blue Mountains. Actually, the psych ward where he works is near to that abyss. Sanity and madness are presented as something that goes far beyond a simple clinic situation: they may be considered almost as a symbol of a vulnerability that is common to every and each human being: we are all at the edge of an abyss – the abyss of mortality. And yet, at the same time, the notion that, even when you have to take care of someone, you are also hit by your own fragility results in an interpretation of human existence as a complex web of caring and being cared. Our common vulnerability may lead human beings to be drawn into the abyss or to dance on the edge of it, even if that dance is precarious. My presentation will focus on the awareness of our common vulnerability as the ground to the construction of an ethics of care.


Teresa Maria Leal de Assunção Martinho Toldy, PhD in Theology (feminist theology) at the Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen (Frankfurt/Germany), Master in Theology (Catholic University, Lisbon) and 1st grade in Theology at the same University. Postdoctorate in CES. Full Professor at Fernando Pessoa University. Teaches in the field of Ethics. Researcher at CES (Thematic Line: Democracy, Justice and Human Rights). Co-coordinator of GT-POLICREDOS together with Júlia Garraio and Luciane Lucas Santos and co-coordinator of GPS, with Ana Cristina Santos e Madalena Duarte. Former Vice-Chair of the Portuguese Association on Women's Studies (2009-2014). Member of the Editorial Board of the ESWTR Studies in Religion and member of ESWTR. Fields of specialization: religion; feminist studies. Other fields of interest: Ethics. Publishes in the fields of religion, gender, and feminist studies.

A decolonial ethics-aesthetics of care


María Grace Salamanca


mgracesal@gmail.com

The current planetary context reveals an urgency to make a philosophy committed to our world. Since its creation, Latin American critical theory has defended the imprint of creating alternatives to create worlds in which all worlds fit, taking up the zapatista’s formulation. In this context, I propose to take an other-path to think about the ethics of care, other than that of modernity-coloniality.

At first, I will present a decolonial reading of the ethics of care, articulating it around three axes: the human condition understood as vulnerable, the dynamics of attention and inattentiveness, typical of the modern world-system, and the contextualization of decisions.

In a second moment, I will describe decolonial aesthetics, to end with the proposal of the aesthetics of care which propose sensitive and sensitizing practices to respond to the ethical urgencies of our time.


María Grace Salamanca concluded a PhD in Philosophy within the framework of a co-direction between the University of Lyon and the research program “Social Actors of the Medicinal Flora in Mexico”, run by the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH). She enjoyed a post-doctoral research stay at the École Urbaine de Lyon, working on the aesthetics of care in the context of the Anthropocene. She is a specialist in the Epistemologies of the South and a theater actress practicing decolonial aesthetics. María is also a member of research and clinical ethics committees and a professor of ethics, bioethics, and epistemology.

Session A


Cristóvão da Silva Marinheiro, Joaquim Braga, & Sjoerd van Tuinen

Critique or Care: Philosophy in a New Key


Sjoerd van Tuinen


vantuinen@esphil.eur.nl

As Foucault has pointed out, modernity or the Enlightenment has been the age of critique. But for quite some time now, it appears that while we are still living the ideological consequences of the Enlightenment, its critical habitus has long run out of steam. We do not live in a post-secular age, in other words, but we do live in a post-critical age – where by critique I undertand a certain rationalist skepticism which functions as dogmatic image of thought. What could take critique’s place? In my contribution I would like to compare two modes of thought or two uses of reason by defining each through the way they interpret the principle of sufficient reason. I will argue that in the Anthropocene, the critical is no longer exclusive to our element of thought, but is to be found in the systems/habitats we live by even as they do not exist ‘for us’. Care, by contrast, concerns the habits in which we reflect on, and feed back into, those systems. Thus today neither critique nor care disappear, but the means-end relation between them is reversed. In order to substantiate this claim, I propose to interpret the principium reddendae rationis not just as a subject-oriented demand, as does Heidegger, but first of all – and following a suggestion made by Michel Serres – as an object-oriented obligation to ‘return’ reason to, and render coherence amongst, everything else that is part of the ‘world’.


Sjoerd van Tuinen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam. After his PhD (Ghent 2009) on Leibniz and Deleuze, he has had visiting affiliations with universities in London, Berlin, Vienna, New York and Princeton. He is editor of over two dozen books, special issues and films, including Deleuze and the Passions (Punctum Books, 2016), The Politics of Debt: Essays and Interviews (Zero Books, 2019), and To Mind is to Care (V2_ Publishers, 2019). Forthcoming monograph: The Philosophy of Mannerism: From Aesthetics to Modal Metaphysics (Bloomsbury, 2022).

'Cura librorum, curator animae?'

Is the care of books

a form of curating our souls?


Cristóvão da Silva Marinheiro


christophe.marinheiro@bnl.etat.lu

What do librarians actually do when curating books? In the first hand, librarians build collections, maintain the material integrity of the copies, and reveal the material evidence books may carry (conservation and valuation). Although these tasks mostly fill the librarian’s daily life, they are not the main reason why public or private entities pay librarians for. If we try to define this aim, we have to go back to the definition of the book itself. Thus, we notice that a book is more than a material object. Taking Jorge Luis Borges’s words, a book is “the enhancement of our intellectual faculties”, giving us the possibility to discuss issues “across centuries and territories”. Assuming this definition of the book, a librarian’s work gets a different and more complex sense we want to develop in this paper.

In how far does this have to do with Care? Curating books is on the one hand caring about someone’s ideas (past or present), interesting enough to be published and hence, public. On the other hand, when reading, entering a discussion “across centuries and territories”, are we not reflecting, meaning in an etymological sense a reflection about ourselves? Isn’t a discussion of someone’s ideas a form of dealing with oneself? Isn’t a reader, in a certain way, taking care of himself by reading? In this paper we will try to relate the librarian’s work to Pierre Hadot’s concept of the cura animae.

On caring acts and

technological mediation processes


Joaquim Braga


bragajoaquim77@gmail.com

Can caring acts be properly understood through technological mediation processes, such as those currently taking place in the so-called “Telehealth” and “Telemedicine”? Could they not be easily reduced to the instrumental criteria of technological mediation and, in turn, to exclusively utilitarian ethical principles?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary, first of all, to inquire whether the relational dimension between caregiver and care receiver – understood by Joan Tronto and Virginia Held as the one that forms the core of caring acts – remains unchanged in technologically mediated acts, to the point that it can be perfectly replaced by these. For, as Tronto points out in Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice (p. 36), when the focus is only placed on “caregiver’s performance”, it tends to be difficult to involve “the political concerns of unequal power among caregivers and care receivers”.

​​In conceptual terms, this paper will bring into play the concept of “relation” as the backbone of caring acts​,​ ​along with the concept of “mediation” ​as a framework for thinking about the very nature of technology. It will be through the articulation of both that I will attempt to answer the two questions mentioned above.


Joaquim Braga is researcher and professor at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Coimbra. He is also a member of the R&D Unit Institute for Philosophical Studies. His graduation in Philosophy took place at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Coimbra. In 2010, at Humboldt University of Berlin, he finished his Ph.D. with a thesis based upon the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. Currently, his research activity covers the fields of Aesthetics, Philosophy of Technology, plus Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, with a special interest in symbolic thought. His works include, among others, Die symbolische Prägnanz des Bildes. Zu einer Kritik des Bildbegriffs nach der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers (Freiburg, 2012), Rethinking Culture and Cultural Analysis—Neudenken von Kultur und Kulturanalyse (Berlin, 2013), Leituras da Sociedade Moderna. Media, Política, Sentido (Coimbra, 2013), Símbolo e Cultura (Coimbra, 2014), Bernard de Mandeville’s Tropology of Paradoxes: Morals, Politics, Economics, and Therapy (New York, 2015), Antropologia da Individuação. Estudos sobre o Pensamento de Ernst Cassirer (Porto Alegre, 2017), Conceiving Virtuality: From Art to Technology (Cham, 2019), Teoria das Formas Imagéticas. Ensaios sobre Arte, Estética, Tecnologia (Coimbra, 2020), Philosophy of Care: New Approaches to Vulnerability, Otherness and Therapy (Cham, 2021).

Session B


Isabella Lundy Mogollón & Javier Gil

Disasters and duties of care

in response to moral distress


Javier Gil


javiergil@uniovi.es

There will be more disasters and they will be more intense. We must prepare for them, while knowing that the exceptional nature of disasters makes even more evident our inherent vulnerability as individuals and as communities and the indispensability of the duties of mutual care that we must collectively assume. This paper will give a perspective from the ethics of disasters.

In contexts of disasters and emergencies with multiple victims, the phenomenon of moral distress – well known to health professionals in ordinary emergency contexts and in clinical settings such as palliative care – is exacerbated. Moral distress should be conceptually distinguished from both emotional distress and moral dilemmas, with which it nevertheless maintains important connections. It is also closely related to a broad view of moral luck and to the more specific phenomenon of moral residue.

In my paper I will claim that a holistic care perspective is needed to address both the organizational and psychological complexities involved in moral distress and that it is primarily the care professionals who suffer most from it (e.g., members of humanitarian assistance teams in overseas disasters or civil protection teams operating in-country) who have to manage it in the first instance. More specifically, I will argue that specific duties of care exist in relation to the strong nexus between moral distress and moral luck (it is those involved in these risky professions and activities who are most likely to face tragic decisions leading to moral distress), as well as in relation to the constitutive link between moral distress and moral residue (professionals and aid workers facing situations of moral distress often carry unresolved internal conflicts with both psychopathological and professional long-term negative consequences). While the triggers of moral distress usually occur in the midst of disaster situations – when difficult and even tragic decisions have to be made in real time –, duties of care extend before and after these actions in the field — i.e. when strategies can and should be prepared or implemented from the mutual aid and care groups of those involved. These strategies must have a central position in both disaster management and disaster ethics. On the one hand, the duties of care of the first type refer fundamentally to training and preparation processes during the pre-disaster phases, which is when the tasks of anticipation and prevention must be enabled. Caregivers have to learn to take care of themselves in anticipation of their likely moral bad luck. On the other hand, duties of the second type essentially concern to the processes of attention and care during the post-disaster phases, which is when recovery tasks have to be enabled. Caregivers have to care for each other and themselves in a collective and skilled manner, among other strategies, through communities of practice.


Associate Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of Oviedo since 2011. He teaches undergraduate courses on political philosophy, moral theory, and applied ethics and a postgraduate course on bioethics and disaster ethics in the Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree in Public Health in Disasters. Javier Gil is currently the main researcher of the research project Ethical duties in disaster contexts (DISASTER), funded by BBVA Foundation Grants for Scientific Research Projects 2021. He is moreover a member of the research teams of two other projects: Civic Constellation III: Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Anti-Liberalism (PGC2018-093573-B-100), and Biological Reproduction, Social Reproduction and Public Sphere (PID2020-115079RB-I, AEI/FEDER, UE).

The Institutional Dimension of Care

at Denison University


Isabella Lundy Mogollón


lundy_i1@denison.edu

How do we think about care within higher education institutions? Synthesizing previous work by Joan Tronto, Eva Kittay, Nel Noddings (among others) I argue that we should reconceptualize the meaning of ‘care as relational’ to place caring relationships within a broader structural context which recognizes that institutions, such as colleges and universities, play an active role in care. Disentangling what this role is requires viewing care as a multifaceted process within which institutions can set the conditions for interpersonal care (caring-for) to occur. To set the right conditions (i.e., to care-about), these institutions must be deliberate and democratic in working out what Tronto describes as purpose, particularity, and power. For higher education institutions this will not be possible without a prior awareness of how closely intertwined care and education are, and thus how fundamental care is in allowing these institutions —both at the structural and interpersonal level— to run smoothly. I conclude by applying this conceptual framework to my own college, Denison University, and exploring some of the practical implications.


Isabella Lundy is a Philosophy and Economics ReMA candidate at Erasmus University Rotterdam (NL). Prior to her arrival in the Netherlands she completed her undergraduate degree at Denison University (USA) where she majored in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). While at Denison, Isabella worked as senior editor for Episteme, the longest-running undergraduate philosophy journal in the US. She is currently seeking to expand her knowledge in care ethics and is primarily interested in the institutional dimension of care.

Session C


Catarina Rebelo, João Emanuel Diogo, José Manuel Beato, & Simão Lucas Pires

Notas Pascalianas sobre o Orgulho


Simão Lucas Pires


simaolucaspires@gmail.com

Embora tenha sido muitas vezes pensada em termos teológicos, em oposição à humildade evangélica, a noção de orgulho presta-se a uma leitura fenomenológica que não está refém de pressupostos religiosos. Aponta para um tipo de relação consigo definida pela confiança nas próprias capacidades pessoais de desempenho existencial, e ciosa do estatuto, auto-atribuído, de centro do mundo, principal juiz e principal beneficiário da vida. O primeiro objectivo da presente comunicação é fixar, a partir de textos de Pascal como os fragmentos dos Pensamentos SELLIER 105, 521 e 743, um retrato deste regime de sentido — que tende, segundo a tradição agostiniana, a impor-se automaticamente como forma básica do cuidado de si. Será dada especial atenção ao modo como o orgulho activa certos mecanismos de defesa diante do desajuste entre os requisitos constitutivos do modo-de-ser humano e a nossa própria limitação pessoal. Analisar-se-á, em particular, uma indicação de Pierre Nicole em “De la faiblesse”, segundo a qual o engrandecimento de si definitório do orgulho depende de uma contracção do campo existencial; bem como a circunstância de, para alimentar tal auto-reconhecimento favorável, o orgulho exigir normalmente algum tipo de corroboração por parte de perspectivas alheias.

Vulnerabilidade e empatia:

o valor da empatia nas práticas

de cuidado


Catarina Rebelo


catarinadrebelo@gmail.com

A empatia tem um valor fundamental, na medida em que pode condicionar o caráter ético e a qualidade das práticas de cuidado. O nosso propósito é pensar este tema a partir da leitura de Michel Dupuis, que a entende como uma «archicompetência» humana de base.


Catarina Rebelo, nasceu em Coimbra em 1982. Licenciou-se em Filosofia em 2006 na vertente científica, pela FLUC. No mesmo ano concluiu o Curso Superior de Acupunctura e Fitoterapia Chinesa, pela a APPA-DA. Em 2009 terminou o mestrado em Relação de Ajuda no ISPA, com a tese «O lugar do corpo na construção da identidade pessoal.» Terminou o doutoramento em Filosofia sob a orientação da Professora Doutora Maria Luísa Portocarrero Ferreira da Silva, sob o tema «Encontro Terapêutico e Filosofia. Um caminho percorrido com Paul Ricoeur.» É membro do IEF desde a sua fundação e investigadora integrada desde novembro de 2020. Trabalha na área da Medicina Tradicional Chinesa desde 2006. Ciência ID: 8911-FC9E-83EF.

O cuidado de si e o cuidado dos outros

nas virtudes morais


José Manuel Beato


jose.beato71@gmail.com

Por ocasião da Iº Congresso Roads to Care explorámos a contiguidade teórica e a convergência prática entre a "ética do cuidado" e a "ética das virtudes". O reconhecimento de uma tal convergência permite, por um lado, conceber e exercer o “cuidado” como uma virtude, quer dizer, como um complexo disposicional afectivo, cognitivo e volitivo conducente a práticas moralmente boas ou excelentes. Por outro lado, ela autoriza, de modo reversível, a entender as virtudes repertoriadas pela tradição como expressões múltiplas do cuidado, graças ao princípio da unidade e reciprocidade das virtudes na virtude.

Esta articulação, e o princípio de reversibilidade a que obedece, conduz, todavia, a uma outra questão. Existe ou não um conflito entre "o cuidado de si" e o "cuidado dos outros" nas éticas de configuração aretiológica? Como se apresenta esta questão na retoma contemporânea da ética das virtudes? Tais são as nossas interrogações.

Aos olhos da critica contemporânea, a noção virtude própria do pensamento antigo, em conformidade com o princípio eudemonista centrado na perfeição do agente que a rege, tende a assumir contornos egocêntricos. Assim sucede, por exemplo, a partir do relevo concedido à noção de "philautia" (estima de si), em Aristóteles, ou de “epiméleia heautoû” (cuidado consigo-mesmo), associada à terapia das paixões e à superação de si, em Platão e Séneca. Já a reconfiguração cristã da moral, a parir, nomeadamente, do influxo da "caritas" agostinhana, confere uma dinâmica mais fundamentalmente heterocêntrica e altruísta à concepção e prática da virtude, já que sem amor, as virtudes dos gregos não passam de "vícios brilhantes".

Um esboço histórico desta problemática perimirá, portanto, entender o modo contemporânea de abordar este problema, particularmente a partir do pensamento de Julia Annas e Michales Slote. Estes sublinham a convergência entre as virtudes centradas no bem do próprio sujeito agente, (self-regarding virtues) e as virtudes centradas no bem do outro, enquanto "paciente moral", (other-regarding virtues).

Quanto a nós, julgamos que o reconhecimento da constituição dialógica da "agentividade" moral e um entendimento fundamentalmente "relacional" das virtudes, entendidas como expressões do "cuidado", reforçados pelo já enunciado princípio da sua unidade e reciprocidade, conduz à superação teórica e prática do conflito entre "cuidado de si" e "cuidado dos outros".

Quando a morte

é o único cuidado possível


João Emanuel Diogo


joaoediogo@gmail.com

Partindo dos conceitos de cuidar de si, cuidar do outro, e cuidar de si pelo outro, procuraremos apresentar as condições em que, para nós, o não cuidado é em si mesmo um cuidar. Explicitando: a morte medicamente assistida é considerada, enquanto acto social e/ou acto médico, uma forma de desistência do cuidar. Por isso, várias ordens profissionais (dos médicos e enfermeiros, p.e.) consideram ir contra o código deontológico dos seus membros.

Interessa-nos aqui demonstrar que o cuidado vai para lá da mera aceitação do curso da doença e que o doente tem a liberdade e a autonomia para decidir o melhor do seu cuidado. Aliás, é já prática corrente na medicina contemporânea, que o doente tenha uma palavra a dizer sobre o tratamento, terapêuticas e afins. Assim, o desejo do cuidar de si transforma-se em cuidar de si pelo outro, e, pela mesma via, no cuidar do outro.

Teremos também oportunidade de sublinhar que a opção sobre o cuidado de si não é sempre actual, e que as demências transportam para o cuidado vários problemas que permitem pensar que o doente possa dizer como se cuidar de si no futuro, quando ele não possa ter uma palavra a dizer. Aliás, é já esse o espírito dos testamentos vitais que promovem uma directiva antecipada da vontade para lá do cuidar do outro tout court.


João Emanuel Diogo é estudante de doutoramento em Filosofia na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra, onde é investigador do Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos e do Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanísticos. Coordenou o livro Crescer nos Afectos, tendo publicado, entre outros, os artigos “Atomismo ético de Leucipo e Demócrito”, "Cartografia da Humanidade: o corpo em Homero” e "Epicuro: Tranquilidade da Prudência”.

Session D


Ana Falcato & Silvia Dadà

Maternity. The paradigm of care

in the doctor-patient relationship


Silvia Dadà


silvia.dada@cfs.unipi.it

The Ethics of care, developed in the United States since the 1980s, has often used the concept of motherhood and the mother-child relationship to describe the main features of its perspective. Against universal, principled thinking and the impersonal, abstract idea of justice, care thinkers instead value relational, contingent and particular thinking, which focuses on responsibility towards others, especially the most vulnerable. Sarah Ruddick in particular speaks of maternal thinking, but references to motherhood can also be found in Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Eva Kittay and Virginia Held. This paradigm undoubtedly has a number of critical points, which have been highlighted by care thinkers themselves. These problematic aspects are mainly related to a possible biologistic interpretation that would reduce the woman to a mother and to the only person responsible for care tasks.

However, with these risks in mind, the idea of motherhood can be very useful in counteracting the reduction of inter-human relations to power relations or instrumental/economic relations.

It is particularly in the field of health care that it can be useful in describing the doctor-patient relationship. Against the classical paternalistic view of the relationship, which saw the doctor in a position of absolute dominance over the patient, but also beyond a reduction of the relationship to contractual and formal protection of the patient's autonomy, I will propose in my intervention a relationship that I will call "maternalism". This term is rarely used, and when it is evoked, it is often wrongly understood as a form of soft paternalism or, on the contrary, as a total cancellation of the doctor's will. Against these interpretations, I will show the importance of this model, which values neither medical authority alone nor the independence of the patient, but rather their relationship.

The intervention will therefore be divided into two parts.

1. In the first part, I will present the main characteristics of maternal thought in the ethics of care, paying particular attention to the way it distances itself from the contractualist paradigm of homo economicus. The main references will be the thought of Sarah Ruddick, Eva Kittay and Virginia Held, linking them to reflections on motherhood by authors belonging to the continental tradition (Levinas and Cavarero).

2. In the second part, I will try to apply this paradigm to the field of medical care, to the relationship between the doctor and the patient. Against the paternalistic relationship, but also beyond the simple protection of autonomy, I will then propose the maternalist model, as an example of care based on the idea of responsibility, trust and empowerment.


Silvia Dadà is post-doctoral researcher at the University of Pisa. She obtained her PhD from the University of Florence with a thesis on the theme of justice in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Now, her research centers on the theme of care and vulnerability as ethical and political concept. On these themes she has written volumes and essays, which includes Il paradosso della giustizia. Levinas e Derrida (Inschibboleth, Roma 2021), Maternità e alterità. Per una bioetica della cura (ETS, Pisa 2021), Etica della vulnerabilità (Morcelliana, Brescia 2022).

The Soft Call of Memory:

On the Need to care for our Elders


Ana Falcato


anafalcato83@gmail.com

In the most consistent and ontologically justified modern defense of Care (Sorge) as the fundamental mode of being that the entity we ourselves are (Dasein or Being-There) has as its own most, Martin Heidegger specifies what he means by ‘care’ in relation with anxiety and its capacity to disclose one’s ultimate worldly trajectory as a meaningful whole, always already anticipated and ahead of which we place ourselves and behave (cf. Heidegger, 1962, §41). Contrary to belief, it is not thereby argued (or meant) that care is (or should be) a mode of behaving or reaching out to our fellow men or – even less – of specifically exerting a social, humanist or cross-generational duty. In spite of his professed wish to keep the Analytic of Dasein separated from any contemporary project of a philosophy of the Subject, Heidegger’s core notion of ‘care’ is deeply egotistical.

In this presentation, I defend an altogether different experience of care, grounded in a deep appeal to one’s earliest memories and the intimate world to which they are anchored and which, under the care of our elders (mostly our grandparents or a generation with more leisure time and availability to nurture a child’s hopes and daily needs), helped form the human being we now are. The strong appeal of a formative bond with caring people that have, in the meantime, become fragile and dependent, imposes a duty of care that is all but burdensome, rooted in my concern for my future, or anticipated lifespan. In fact, the need to care for our elders now is yet another common enterprise – just as our first shared experiences were joint ventures – and the daily routine of help and assistance, sheltered by a common emotional background, is one of joy and shared purpose, notwithstanding our different stations and critical needs in life.


Ana Falcato holds a PhD in Philosophy from NOVA/FCSH. Between 2013 and 2015, she was a Humboldt Research Fellow at the Johannes-Gutenberg University and the University of Oxford. Her academic work appeared in Studies in the Novel, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Kant-Studien, Wittgenstein-Studien, Daimon: Revista International de Filosofía, Text and Talk, Filosofia Unisinos, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, and Cosmos and History. Ana published Philosophy in the Condition of Modernism with Palgrave Macmillan in 2018 and Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values with Cambridge Scholar Publishing in 2019. In 2021 she published, with Palgrave Macmillan, The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves, and in 2023 shall appear, with Routledge, her new edited volume: The Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Ana is an appointed Research Fellow at IFILNOVA (Lisbon), where she leads a project about the novelistic and critical work of J.M. Coetzee. Over the past six years she organized several international meetings at NOVA/FCSH, and in all of them systematically presented work on negative moral emotions and their repercussion both in Coetzee's fictional universe and in modern and contemporary philosophy.

Session E


António Dores, Vasco Cordovil Cardoso, & Vera Silva

O panótico de Bentham

e os cuidados enredados na prisão


António Dores & Vera Silva


apad1956@gmail.com & verainescostasilva@gmail.com

A prisão é parte de um emaranhado de redes de relações de cuidado – os cuidados inerentes à subsistência e sobrevivência na inospitalidade das sociedades modernas. As pessoas, treinadas desde crianças, aprendem a viver isoladas. No limite, vivem institucionalizadas ou sujeitas às experiências de visitar e cuidar de pessoas institucionalizadas.

O desafio aqui colocado consiste em reflectir sobre as formas de domesticação e fabricação social moderna dos cuidados da governação imperial incorporadas e naturalizadas pelas populações. As discriminações institucionalmente induzidas em sociedade contam com as prisões para legitimar contornos perversos e maniqueísta (marginalidade-impunidade; lumpen-trabalhador; preso-guarda; mulher-homem) na gestão dos corpos encarcerados, expressando e reforçando práticas sociais punitivas generalizadas.

Jeremy Bentham (2000), o grande filósofo utilitarista do penitenciário, citado por Michel Foucault (2018), desenhou as dimensões morais, jurídicas e arquitectónicas conjugadas para desenvolver programas de cuidados para os corpos criminalizados, corpos exemplares que deveriam ser replicados em todas as outras instituições modernas.

Este resultado intelectual e político não pode ser lido de forma especializada, como se a prisão fosse um fenómeno extrassocial, uma sociedade à parte, como acontece vulgarmente. Tem de ser compreendido no quadro do semi-milenar projecto imperial de exploração da Terra para fins de acumulação de riqueza e de disponibilidade de humanos e não humanos para tal fim. A centralidade da divisão entre a boa humanidade – a que é útil às necessidades da missão imperial – e a má humanidade – a que resiste moral e politicamente ao projecto e deve ser fisicamente ameaçada e confinada - é reveladora do sentido da moral dominante e do significado por esta atribuído à liberdade e, em particular, à mobilidade.

Bentham desenvolveu, ao serviço da Europa imperial, um protótipo de penitenciária: um lugar de domesticação inspirado noutros lugares carcerários anteriores ao penitenciário para dominar mulheres e crianças. Um lugar para acolhimento de pessoas marginalizadas, como órfãos ou descendentes de escravos, e para insurgentes políticos.

A dois séculos de distância de Bentham, o panótico representa uma arquitectura penitenciária, na realidade raramente usada, e uma arquitectura social de isolamento avaliado pelo mérito praticado de forma generalizada até nas classes de elite (Markovits, 2019), raramente citada. Representa também o assistencialismo carcerário (Wacquant, 2000), já que cabe aos estados subsidiar - para além da banca privada, falida com o crash de 2008, ou as companhias aéreas e as empresas de comunicação social, falidas pela crise pandémica - as pessoas classificadas como pobres, sobretudo famílias monoparentais, crianças maltratadas ou sem cuidadores, idosos e outras intersubjetividades sujeitas ao abandono e marginalização sociais. Desse magma de restos sociais da modernidade é seleccionada a esmagadora maioria das pessoas criminalizadas, acolhidas em estabelecimentos prisionais e a viver à conta do estado – quando poderiam viver de outro modo se as alternativas à prisão fossem usadas para substituir as penitenciárias.


António Dores é professor de sociologia no ISCTE-IUL, autor de um blog (libertacao.hypotheses.org/) e de vários livros, os últimos dos quais Estado Social Real, 2020, e Reeducar o Século XXI: libertar o espírito científico, 2021. É coordenador nacional do Observatório Europeu das Prisões e foi animador da ACED – Associação Contra a Exclusão pelo Desenvolvimento, criada por presos entre 1997 e 2016. Membro da coordenação do World Social Sciences and Humanities Network. Criador das cadeiras de sociologia da violência (http://home.iscte-iul.pt/~apad/MSV) e globalização, justiça social e direitos humanos (http://gsjhr.ms.ds.iscte.pt).

Vera Inês Costa da Silva, mestre e doutoranda em Antropologia Social e Cultural na FCTUC, investigadora integrada no CRIA-UC, encontra-se a finalizar a sua investigação de doutoramento: Configurações de género nas prisões femininas: permanências, continuidades e variações. Entre 2015 e 2017 foi investigadora nos projetos transnacionais: CEINAV e Bystanders na FPCEUP. Com atividade em diversas organizações e projetos feministas, nacionais e internacionais, como a Marcha Mundial das Mulheres. Colabora no Observatório Europeu das Prisões, e em projetos e organizações de apoio e defesa dos direitos das pessoas presas e das suas famílias. ORCiD: 0000-0002-9998-8586.

Cuidado de si e vontade de verdade

– um nó apertado

visto a partir de Kierkegaard


Vasco Cordovil Cardoso


vascocordovilcardoso@gmail.com

Aparentemente, e valendo-nos, por exemplo, do testemunho de Platão e da generalidade da tradição antiga, não há conflito, muito pelo contrário, entre o mandato “cuida de ti mesmo” e o apelo fundador da investigação filosófica ao exame. Na verdade, a vontade de verdade que dá origem ao empreendimento filosófico revela-se como estando ainda por cumprir, uma vez exposto o esqueleto da vida, no centro do qual está o cuidado de si: é justamente porque está obrigado a cuidar de si que o sujeito não pode senão desejar saber quem é, onde está, quem deve ser e como chegar a sê-lo.

Mas se é da vida que sai a necessidade de clarificação, é mais difícil circular no sentido inverso. Desde os cépticos antigos que a humanidade é confrontada com o conflito escandaloso entre pensamento e ser, entre a investigação e a vida, e entre dias claros que não deixam de nascer das mais escuras noites da dúvida. Desde aí que, aos olhos do cuidado de si, que grita a urgência vital de acertar, o rosto da procura pela verdade foi pintado com as cores da armadilha, do labirinto e da prisão. Se não se pode viver sem pensar, não parece, contudo, possível deduzir clara e distintamente, de uma vez por todas, o que há a fazer.

O nó que resulta do cruzamento das tensões em causa no cuidado de si e na vontade de verdade está no centro das preocupações de Soren Kierkegaard, como testemunha, por exemplo, a obra "Johannes Climacus - ou De Omnibus Dubitandum Est". O objectivo geral desta comunicação é clarificar de que forma este se encontra apresentado na obra de Kierkegaard, fundamentalmente em "Johannes Climacus", a partir dos conceitos de imediato/possível, reflexão/decisão e ainda, e particularmente, dos conceitos de dúvida e de interesse.

Para isso, em primeiro lugar, procurar-se-á clarificar quais os requisitos que devem ser cumpridos, tendo em conta o quadro desenhado por Kierkegaard, para que possa emergir uma dúvida real. Em segundo lugar, procurar-se-á clarificar em que medida uma “dúvida real total” é, por um lado desejável, e por outro, exequível. Por último, analisar-se-á brevemente o problema de saber se o conceito de decisão é por si só capaz de desfazer o nó entre interesse por si e pela verdade.

Desta forma espera-se poder contribuir para o desenho mais amplo das relações que se estabelecem entre cuidado e filosofia e dar mais um passo numa das muitas estradas para o cuidado.


Vasco Cordovil Cardoso é doutorando desde 2019 em Filosofia, na Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, e é membro do Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos da Universidade de Coimbra. Está a estudar, com o apoio da Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, a pertinência filosófica da obra de G. K. Chesterton, em particular no que diz respeito à vontade e possibilidade de acesso à verdade. A sua tese de mestrado em Filosofia Geral foi sobre o conceito de vontade de verdade nas Confissões de Santo Agostinho e antes de começar o doutoramento, foi professor de Filosofia no Ensino Secundário.

Session F


Agostino Cera, Carlo Botrugno, & Paulo Alexandre e Castro

Geoengineering as Techno-Care:

Ethical Issues in the Anthropocene


Agostino Cera


agostino.cera@unife.it

My paper sketches an ethical paradox emerging within the Anthropocene: the Paradox of the Omni-responsibility. This paradox finds its concrete realization as Techno-care.

My basic assumption is that the Anthropocene equates to an ambiguous idea since it presents some ideological features hidden under neutral (scientific) statements. This “paradigm dressed as epoch” expresses an uncritical acceptance of the (con)fusion between techné and physis which takes place in our age and whose final outcome is a “de-naturated image of nature”, i.e. a “Technature”. As a result, the Anthropo-cene stands out as Techno-cene: the epoch in which technology becomes “the subject of history”.

Within this unprecedented scenario, human being leaves the role of the lord of a nature understood as object and takes on that of the “Planetary Manager” of a nature understood as living being. More precisely, nature becomes a kind of pet, i.e. something living but entirely dependent on our capability to take care of it and therefore something for which we (must) feel totally responsible. I define this phenomenon Pet-ification of Nature. A concrete example of Pet-ification of Nature can be found in the so-called geoengineering as solution to the climate change. At the basis of this strategy lies the following principle: against technology (its excesses), more technology is needed. Geoengineering is not only “techno-fix” but a real Techno-care, i.e. the proof that within the Anthropocene technology represents the condition of possibility for ethics. Our technological possibilities turn into moral imperatives.

The combination between the Pet-ification of Nature and the absolutization of the responsibility of the Planetary Manager generates the Ethical Paradox of Omni-Responsibility. Human being’s ecological duty of total caretaking of its own environment gives birth to a new form of anthropocentrism not less problematic than the traditional one. It is the Aidosean Prometheanism as outcome of an Aidosean man (after Aidos, the Greek goddess of humility), who feels himself ‘only’ the steward/manager of a nature conceived as a living being. However, this living being is thought to be in need of a total (techno-)care. Promethean hybris emerges here as the paradoxical result of human’s hyper-interest and omni-responsibility towards nature. Techno-care is the sum of technological omni-power and ethical omni-responsibility.

The Anthropocene proves to be the epoch in which Jonas’ “imperative of responsibility” no longer works, precisely because it becomes entirely achievable. Ethically speaking, this means that our age demands we acknowledge the Limits of Responsibility: the possible dangerous consequences of our best intentions, when they become entirely achievable. At the same time, our age demands that we become aware of a new ethical problem: the potential aporia between the responsibility for the other and the respect of its otherness, namely of the fact that no authentic “Verantwortlichkeit (responsibility) is possible without “Gelassenheit (releasement).

The acknowledgment of this aporia also suggests the first step for its overcoming: a renewed dialogue between responsibility and releasement, between Jonas and Heidegger. In the Anthropocene’s ethical toolbox cannot miss an Imperative of Gelassenheit, next to the Imperative of Responsibility.


Agostino Cera is assistant professor of theoretical philosophy at the Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici of the Università di Ferrara (Italy). He works on XIXth-XXth century German philosophy, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of technology and, more recently, on the Anthropocene.

Care and Transhumanism:

Will My Emotional Mind Change?


Paulo Alexandre e Castro


paecastro@gmail.com

In the history of philosophy, it is not uncommon to find a reinvention of self-care that comes from Socrates, and is found, for example, in Saint Augustine, Descartes, Rousseau and reaches the analyses of Foucault, Heidegger and Hans Jonas. However, the notion of care has undergone profound transformations (not only at a philosophical level but also at a cultural, scientific, medical, and aesthetic level) and which we can say, culminates in this movement called transhumanism that nineteenth-century literature began to explore. Care gets tangled up in everyday life and jumps the barrier of the academy. It is on this conception of the search for enhancement of the human condition through sophisticated technologies (which seek to increase longevity, sports performance, cognitive abilities, etc.) that the notion of care can be reconsidered, based on a fundamental question: is this kind of care an alteration of human nature? If so, does my emotional mind remain?

'Homo medicus digitalis:'

Challenges and paradoxes of

digital health(care) in unequal societies


Carlo Botrugno


carlo.botrugno@unifi.it

Since the declaration of the pandemic by the WHO on 12th March 2020, national governments have adopted multiple strategies aimed at replacing in-person healthcare delivery with access to telemedicine, telemonitoring, and online care tools such as apps and chatbots. Promoting the spread and accessibility of digital health services played a fundamental role in overcoming the significant healthcare barriers caused by quarantine, lockdown, and self-isolation (Reiss et al. 2020). The digitalisation of healthcare runs in parallel with the increasing reliance on information technologies and quantification tools in medicine. Based on their capacity to process an impressive amount of health data, machine learning algorithms are proliferating rapidly in medical practice, providing impressive opportunities to improve diagnostic accuracy and care efficacy. However, this spread of digital health and the incessant informatisation of medicine are slowly but inexorably reshaping the innermost features of medical practice itself, including the relationship between healthcare professionals and their patients. Not only are patients’ bodies being virtualised to the detriment of doctor-patient relationships and the human valences in medicine, but the authority of (human) doctors is also being challenged. The digital activation of patients contributes to blurring the lines between healthcare organisation and caring for their own health (Lupton 2013). In such a context, it can be useful to evoke the homo medicus digitalis, i.e. an individual who is expected to successfully engage in a wide array of digitally mediated activities and services, based on their assumed capacity to “rationally” calculate the pros and cons of their choices and behaviours in the health field (Botrugno 2020). Using Foucault (1979), this rationality turns patients into “self-entrepreneurs” or managers of their own health. However, at the core of the homo medicus digitalis is the idea of “infra-pathologisation” of health, which moves the barycentre of care from the condition of health to the risk status. In such a perspective, every healthy person can be a patient, and every patient can be a digitally engaged individual. Given the enormous commercial influence in this domain, there is a risk that digital health and informational medicine can further exacerbate commodification in healthcare and shift the responsibility for the health of the population from public interest to a personal ability. However, the success of this “entrepreneurship” is largely based on the possession of a wide array of material objects (e.g. technological devices and internet access) and immaterial resources (e.g. self-determination, and health and digital literacy). As is known, contemporary healthcare systems already suffer from internal asymmetries which distribute access to medical expertise and healthcare services unequally (Marmot 2017). Even though digital health is emphatically marketed as a unique opportunity to reduce healthcare inequalities, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated just how its massive spread can play against those populations who already suffer from inadequate access to healthcare (Robinson et al. 2020).


Carlo Botrugno, PHD, BSW, LLM, LLB, is Assistant Professor at the Department of Legal Sciences of the University of Florence; founder and coordinator of the Research Unit on Everyday Bioethics and Ethics of Science (RUEBES); responsible of the Law Clinic in Bioethics at School of Law of University of Florence; and editor-in-chief of L’Altro Diritto Journal (ISSN: 1827-0565). He is a consultant at the European Oncological Institute (IEO) in Milan; a member of the Clinical Ethics Committee (CEC) at AUSL-IRCCS Reggio Emilia Research Hospital; a lecturer for the Master course on eHealth and Telemedicine Management at Rome Business School (RBS); and a guest lecturer in PhD, Master and graduate programs on bioethics, biolaw, digital health and telemedicine in several countries in Europe and Latin-America. He was a consultant at Bioethics Unit at AUSL-IRCCS Reggio Emilia Research Hospital (2021); a visiting professor at Pernambuco Federal University (2019); a visiting professor at University of Tilburg (2019); a postdoctoral researcher at Institute of Health Care Ethics at Slovak Medical University (2018); a visiting scholar at Center for Social Studies (CES) at University of Coimbra (2015); a visiting scholar at the Experimental Research Unit on Bioethics and Ethics of Science (LAPEBEC) at Clinical Hospital in Porto Alegre (2015); a visiting scholar at Uniritter dos Reis in Porto Alegre (2015); a researcher and teaching fellow at Interdepartmental Research Centre on History of Law, Philosophy and Sociology of Law and Legal Informatics (currently Alma-AI) at University of Bologna (2009-2015). His research interests stem from: bioethics and medical ethics, ELSI of telemedicine, digital health and AI in healthcare, technological innovation in healthcare, health law and data protection in healthcare, medical devices regulation, end of life care, bioethics and racism, human rights and migration issues, discrimination and citizenship, vulnerability, social and political determinants of health.

Session G


Fernando Sadio Ramos, Marcela Uchôa, & María Angustias Ortiz-Molina

Desenvolvimento pessoal de seniores

através da prática da expressão

dramática


Fernando Sadio Ramos & María Angustias Ortiz-Molina


framos@esec.pt & maortiz@ugr.es

A comunicação apresentará os resultados de um projecto de intervenção sociocultural com população sénior, utilizando a Expressão Dramática: ExeDraSen – Expressão Dramática com Seniores.

O seu desenvolvimento assentou na criação de um Clube de Expressão Dramática (CED), na Escola Superior de Educação do Politécnico de Coimbra (ESE-PC).

Referir-nos-emos brevemente à origem e actividades do Clube para apresentar os resultados do projecto ExeDraSen.

Primeiro, procederemos à fundamentação e apresentação geral do projecto pedagógico em curso, desenvolvendo os conceitos de Sustentabilidade Curricular e Aprendizagem em Serviço, e apresentaremos os instrumentos pedagógicos desenvolvidos para o efeito.

Em segundo lugar, referiremos brevemente a experiência pedagógica da qual resultou a criação posterior do CED “Os Putos” (Dezembro de 2015). Teve lugar no âmbito da Unidade Curricular de Educação Não-Formal com Populações Específicas, incluída no 3.º ano do Curso de Teatro e Educação da ESE-PC; aí, os alunos desenvolvem projectos de intervenção sociocultural com populações específicas, tendo um deles sido preparado de modo a ser implementado posteriormente na Escola de Educação Sénior da ESE-PC.

Uma breve sinopse das actividades desenvolvidas desde então constituirá o terceiro momento da comunicação, tratando da entrada em funcionamento do CED “Os Putos” na ESE-PC, envolvendo 15 pessoas seniores, alunos da Escola de Educação Sénior sita na ESE-PC. Apresentaremos alguns dos trabalhos de prática estética desenvolvidos pelos membros d’ “Os Putos”.

Finalmente, apresentar-se-ão os resultados do Projecto ExeDraSen, onde procedimentos de investigação biográfico-narrativa são organizados e postos em acção para tematizar o desenvolvimento pessoal dos membros do Clube, efectuado por meio da prática estética da Expressão Dramática, e de acordo com a percepção e reflexão dos participantes recolhida no correspondente instrumento de investigação.


Fernando José Sadio-Ramos é Doutor em “Curriculum, Professorado e Instituições Educativas”, pela Universidade de Granada (Registo na Universidade de Coimbra). Detém também um Diploma de “Estudos Avançados em Didáctica e Organização Escolar” (Universidade de Granada), um Mestrado em Filosofia Contemporânea e uma Licenciatura em Filosofia pela Universidade de Coimbra. É Professor Adjunto do Departamento de Educação, Desporto e Intervenção Social da Escola Superior de Educação do Politécnico de Coimbra. É Membro Integrado da Unidade de I&D I.E.F. (Universidade de Coimbra) e Colaborador do Grupo de Investigação HUM-672 A.R.E.A. (Universidade de Granada). Sadio-Ramos é ainda Membro Integrado do N.I.E.F.I. (Escola Superior de Educação do Politécnico de Coimbra) e Director da revista científica DEDiCA. REVISTA DE EDUCAÇÃO E HUMANIDADES (Editorial Universidad de Granada). É responsável por uma ampla produção científica, pedagógica e organizacional, em termos de publicações, estadas de investigação, marcas registadas, participação em projectos de investigação, etc. ORCiD: 0000-0001-7654-5638.

María Angustias Ortiz-Molina é Doutora em História da Arte pela Universidade de Granada. Detém um Título Superior de Conservatório, especialidade de Piano, e uma Licenciatura em História da Arte pela Universidade de Granada. É Profesora da Educação Básica e Catedrática E.U. de Didáctica da Expressão Musical da Universidade de Granada. Ortiz-Molina é ainda Membro do Grupo de Investigação HUM-672 A.R.E.A. (Universidade de Granada) e Responsável Científico de DEDiCA. REVISTA DE EDUCAÇÃO E HUMANIDADES (Editorial Universidad de Granada). É responsável por uma ampla produção científica, pedagógica e organizacional, em termos de projectos de investigação, publicações, teses de doutoramento orientadas, estadas de investigação, patentes, etc. ORCiD: 0000-0003-2857-5992.

O estatuto do cuidador informal

em Portugal e a instrumentalização

do trabalho não pago: as mulheres

no centro da reprodução capitalista


Marcela Uchôa


maruchoa@gmail.com

A recente implementação do Estatuto do Cuidador Informal em Portugal, promulgado em 2019 e aplicado em março de 2020, em plena pandemia, reacendeu a necessidade de se debater as condições da mulher na função de cuidadora, a sobrecarga de trabalho e a objetificação do trabalho doméstico. Pensar os artifícios da lógica capitalista que incidem sobre países semiperiféricos como Portugal nos ajuda a compreender as posições de ambiguidade que fazem com que políticas públicas tão “rudimentares” ainda sejam propostas como garantias para que a mulher exerça com segurança mínima um trabalho que deveria ser amparado pelo Estado. A tentativa de reformar o capitalismo e torná-lo mais humano não foi capaz de nos dar qualquer garantia do fim das desigualdades, suas repetidas medidas assistenciais e de emergência em caso de crise têm nos alienado e deixado uma lacuna relevante na luta por justiça social e económica.

Session H


Maria da Conceição Camps & Urania Lanestosa Baca

Da filaúcia à assédia.

Histórico de uma patologia

contemporânea


Maria da Conceição Camps


camps.maria@gmail.com

Nesta comunicação propomos um itinerário sobre o modo como as síndromes depressivas típicas da sociedade ocidental contemporânea radicam nalgumas das denominadas doenças espirituais pré-modernas. Se nos nossos dias os termos «espírito» e «doença» se encontram irradicados da linguagem considerada formalmente aceite em meios clínicos e académicos, já que apontam para domínios vulgarmente considerados paracientíficos, também não deixa de ser evidente que as tribulações do homem de hoje permanecem as mesmas do homem de sempre dada a sua condição de ser contingente e mortal que sabe que o é. Em contrapartida, a sociedade constantemente renovada e vigorosa, exige-lhe desempenhos impecáveis e infalíveis, contrários à sua caduca condição.

La política pública de cuidado infantil

en México: el caso de las estancias

infantiles para apoyar a

madres trabajadoras


Urania Lanestosa Baca


uranialb@gmail.com

El Programa Estancias Infantiles (PEI) buscó contribuir a la generación de empleo femenino y a la satisfacción de necesidades de cuidado. La representación de la mujer-madrecuidadora estuvo presente en el diseño de este programa; con el apoyo de recursos públicos miles de mujeres en todo México, se convirtieron en responsables de estancias infantiles.

Buena parte de ellas instalaron estancias infantiles en sus propios hogares o en propiedes familiares, lo que tensiona las fronteras entre lo público y lo privado. ¿Dónde termina el ámbito de lo doméstico y dónde comienza su espacio de trabajo? ¿Cómo coexiste el cuidado infantil como trabajo remunerado en un mismo tiempo, espacio y corporalidad con el cuidado no remunerado que estas mujeres realizan cotidianamente en sus hogares?

Luego de 12 años de operación las estancias infantiles en México han enfrentado significativos cambios. Con la cancelación de este programa en 2019, un importante número de mujeres que por años se dedicaron al cuidado infantil como trabajo remunerado, vivieron una reducción de su salario y en muchos casos, perdieron su empleo como consecuencia de las transformaciones de la política pública y de la pandemia por COVID-19.

Toda política pública tiene efectos deseados y otros no planificados. Este trabajo busca problematizar los efectos de la política pública de cuidado infantil en las responsables de estancias infantiles. Poco se conoce sobre los impactos que las decisiones gubernamentales y el contexto de pandemia han tenido en la experiencia y vida cotidiana de estas mujeres. Por ello considero necesario ampliar el conocimiento sobre lo que hoy sabemos de estos espacios de cuidado infantil y de las mujeres que han dedicado muchas horas de su vida a realizar este trabajo que permite el sostenimiento de la vida.

Aunque el gobierno federal destacó que estos cambios no tenían como finalidad el cierre de estancias infantiles, las evidencias existentes muestran que sí contribuyeron a la disminución en la oferta de servicios de cuidado para las madres trabajadoras que no cuentan con seguridad social y también a contar con una menor cantidad de espacios en los que las mujeres pudieran emplearse y tener una fuente de ingresos para la satisfacción de sus necesidades cotidianas.

Las decisiones gubernamentales al inicio del programa y en su cancelación, tampoco estuvieron orientadas a desfeminizar el cuidado infantil y contribuyeron a que una vez más, las responsabilidades se concentraran en el espacio privado, reforzando el régimen familista caracterizado por una mayor responsabilidad del bienestar en las familias y particularmente en las mujeres.

El confinamiento como consecuencia del COVID-19 ha representado una larga pausa en su actividad laboral, así como una pérdida significativa de sus ingresos que al día de hoy, prevalece para muchas responsables. Su perspectiva acerca de la difícil situación que han enfrentado y los cambios en su vida cotidiana se ha mantenido invisibilizada y en silencio.


Urania Lanestosa Baca es Licenciada en Pedagogía por la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Maestra en Políticas Públicas y Género por la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO, México) y Especialista en Políticas de Cuidado con Perspectiva de Género por FLACSO Brasil-Centro Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO). A la fecha es estudiante del Doctorado en Estudios Feministas de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (UAM, Xochimilco) donde está desarrollando la investigación El "Programa de Estancias Infantiles para apoyar a madres trabajadoras" desde las experiencias de sus responsables: análisis feminista de la política pública en México. Ha coordinado proyectos educativos y de activismo juvenil y procesos de formación con metodologías participativas en México, Honduras, Guatemala, Perú, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay y Puerto Rico. Ejerce como tutora de la Maestría en Políticas Públicas y Género de FLACSO. Entre sus temas de investigación se incluyen: el cuidado, la educación en derechos humanos, los derechos sexuales y reproductivos, la juventud, el análisis de políticas públicas y los feminismos.

Session I


Brunella Casalini, Gael Caignard, & Lucia Re

Philosophy of care and (inter)national

constitutionalism. A fruitful alliance

for a caring democracy


Lucia Re


lucia.re@unifi.it

Only recently has the philosophy of law and, more generally, legal reflection begun to approach the political theory of care. The emphasis on the opposition between the ethics of justice and the ethics of care has long nurtured a triple misunderstanding. On the one hand, a certain interpretation of Carol Gilligan’s In A Different Voice, emphasized this opposition, even if Gilligan’s following reflection and other scholars’ works have opened up the possibility of delineating a dynamic and potentially harmonious relationship between the "moral voices" of justice and care. On the other hand, the ethics of justice has been identified primarily with the neocontractualism of John Rawls. Finally, this ethics of justice and the language of rights have often been confused. However, the current system of human rights and the fundamental rights recognized in constitutional democracies and in international law cannot be identified with contractualism nor with the theory of natural law, in the name of their historical genesis. Nor can they be traced back to neo-contractualism. Rather, law is a social practice whose reasons for existence and contents depend on the attitudes of the interpreters who are forged in the historical contingency. Today, this practice is oriented, in constitutional democracies and within international and regional bodies committed to the protection of human rights, by the belief system developed within (inter)national constitutionalism since the second half of the twentieth century. It is a political and legal project based on the principle of equality and the recognition of the dignity of every human being. (Inter)national constitutionalism has enriched the liberal legal tradition by theorizing the subject of law as an embodied subject and by recognizing its ontological vulnerability and situated needs. Starting from an interpretation of law as social practice, the paper intends to show the many affinities between the political project of twentieth-century (inter)national constitutionalism, which today is under the attack of neoliberalism, and the political theory of care. The latter is thus a valuable ally of (inter)national constitutionalism, as it contributes to its innovation and defense, by making visible subjects and needs that have been neglected until now and developing a set of social practices and molecular resistances. In turn, (inter)national constitutionalism represents an inalienable legacy to draw on for the realization of a caring democracy, since it has prepared the institutions and guarantees that care can today strengthen and re-signify. Together they can fight off the neoliberal counterattack that intends to permanently subvert the political project of equality.

The need of an “ecology of attention”

in a Caring Democracy


Brunella Casalini


brunella.casalini@unifi.it

In Moral Boundaries (1993) Joan Tronto defines care a “practice” and individuates four phases of care (caring for, caring about, taking care of and care receiving), which she further expands in Caring Democracy with the addition of a fifth phase (caring with). The present paper has two main aims: the first one is to understand what we gain theoretically from a definition of care as a practice (instead of labor, or an emotion or a principle -- see Tronto 1993; Mol, Moser, Pols 2010) and to explore once again the different phases of care, the tensions and conflicts that may emerge between them in a neoliberal society (cf. Zechner 2021); the second aim is to deal with the particular epistemology of attention that must be presupposed as a "conditio sine qua non", even if never sufficient by itself, to pass from the first to the following phases of care. A real caring democracy needs an “ecology of attention” (Citton 2014). In the present "economy of attention" that has established a regime of mass distraction we need to learn again the art of listening to the (human or non human) other and of paying attention (Stengers 2013), developing a horizontal rationality (Code 2008).


Brunella Casalini is associate professor of Political Philosophy and teaches at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Florence, Italy. Some recent publications: "Care and Injustice," International Journal of Care and Caring 4 (2020), 59-73, ISSN: 2397-8821; "The nurturing language of care ethics and of other related feminist approaches: Opposing contemporary neoliberal politics," in Peter Urban and Lizzie Ward (Eds.) Care Ethics, Democratic Citizenship and the State, 117-136. Basingstoke, MacMillan: Plagrave, MacMillan, 2020, ISBN: 978-3-030-41436-8; Il femminismo e le sfide del neoliberismo. Postfemminismo, sessismo, politiche della cura. Roma: IF Press, 2018: ISBN: 978-88-6788-134-5.

Session J


Beatriz Rayon Viña

Communication and 'dis'connection

in the 21st century society


Beatriz Rayon Viña


uo216817@uniovi.es

In the context of the interconnected world in which we live today, communications and connections between people are a basis for coexistence and people's mental health. In the midst of the lockdown due to the spread of SARS-CoV-2, when we were forced to distance and isolate ourselves, the Internet was the key to the socialization of millions of people around the world, becoming a cornerstone for information, service management, social gatherings through digital means, online education and health. However, we live in a world marked by a Digital Divide (it is estimated that 50% of the planet's population does not have internet) and there are certain difficulties derived from the lack of access to a "technological life", and also from the lack of knowledge on how to use these technologies, at various levels, and what "our digital rights" are. Reality (social and vital) is made up of people interacting and part of society lives a large part of its time connected to a device. On the Internet we inform ourselves, we educate ourselves, we communicate, we recreate ourselves. The Internet was a pillar for the mental health of many in a time of confusion, isolation and anguish. Although it was originally conceived as a tool for the transmission of information, with the passage of time and use it has expanded its horizons and has become a pillar of society. The Digital Divide is not a new problem, but with the advance and development of technology and under the circumstances that we have experienced around the world, it has become a dramatic source of injustice. The lack of connection is considered as a big issue by international organizations and solutions are demanded because they imply an indirect violation of rights. How to stop and overcome the Digital Divide is an issue that has been studied before, and now it has to be debated as it is more alive than ever. But beyond the issues of distribution, education and resources that it may involve, we have the question of "how" to manage this reality, where to fit the rights (figuratively speaking and also legislation itself), the duties that they entail and the implications of this model of cybercommunication-society that we have, at a structural level and at an individual and community level. And it is also time to ask ourselves where we are going: is the technological society we are heading towards desirable? how should we manage it? and what principles of justice should we take into account?


Beatriz Rayón is a Philosophy PhD candidate at the University of Oviedo, where she is researching on the theory of justice and the digital divide. She also holds a Master's degree in Human Rights with a specialization in Biolaw from the National University of Distance Education (UNED) and a degree in Philosophy, also from the University of Oviedo. She is a member of the IF (Engineering and Philosophy) working group of the MediaLab of the University of Oviedo. She has recently completed a research stay at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon. Her main academic interests are in moral and political philosophy, specifically regarding issues of redistribution and recognition in justice.

Musical performance


Daniel Santos, Dino Batalha, Sérgio Braga, & Valentyn Adamenko

Esquecid@s no manicómio



Com atenção a todos os seres que sofrem, os Sobral Cid renderão particular homenagem àquelas pessoas que são condicionadas, negligenciadas e vítimas de agressões sob os auspícios de instituições prestadoras de cuidados mentais. Não é aceitável que por vezes pareça preferível o abandono à solidão ou à morte do que o abrigo institucionalizado. Com a alegria e a vitalidade próprias de uma atitude interventiva e irónica que vence o cansaço e a cólera face à realidade do mal, os Sobral Cid proporcionarão um espetáculo implicado numa atmosfera de resistência poética e de confiança para desafiar as carências, os desmoronamentos e a rítmica dos impactos perversos das edificações sociais contemporâneas.


Os Sobral Cid são um quarteto independente de rock folclórico cujas atuações têm sido aclamadas como uma das principais manifestações do movimento underground português do presente século. Fundados em Coimbra e em constante atividade em Portugal, os Sobral Cid são constituídos por Daniel Santos, Dino Batalha, Sérgio Braga e Valentyn Adamenko.

A PDF version of the Book of Abstracts is available, including the program and all remaining details pertaining to this Colloquium.

Obtain a free copy and further information via Zenodo

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7294708

By clicking or tapping on the logos supra, more details can be found concerning our Research and Development Unit, the Institute for Philosophical Studies, as well as our venue, the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Coimbra, and the funder of the UIDB/00010/2020 project, the Foundation for Science and Technology of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of the Government of the Portuguese Republic, under which the 2nd IEF International Colloquium "Roads to Care" ecloses.

Please do not hesitate to contact us at roadstocare@gmail.com.

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