This paper offers novel insights regarding the role of complexity in both the transitional and the long-run dynamics of the economy. We devise an endogenous growth model using the concept of entropy as a state-dependent complexity effect. This allows us to gradually diminish scale effects as the economy develops along the transitional dynamics, which conciliates evidence on the existence of scale effects in history with evidence of no or reduced scale effects in today’s economies. We show that empirical evidence supports entropy as a “first principle” operator of the complexity effect. The model features endogenous growth, with null or small (positive or negative) scale effects, or stagnation, in the long run. These different long-run possibilities have also policy implications. Then, we show that the model can replicate well the take-off after the industrial revolution and the productivity slowdown in the second half of the XXth century. Future scenarios based on in-sample calibration are discussed, and may help to explain (part of) the growth crises affecting the current generation.

In this article, we argue that inflation increases complexity pertaining to knowledge

production (or R&D). Then, we expand a recently developed complexity index based

on entropy to include the effect of inflation. As a result of this new mechanism in an

endogenous growth model, inflation is no longer superneutral. In the model, inflation

can decrease economic growth in a nonlinear way, a sudden upward shock on inflation

can severely hurt economic growth and an inflation cut can be responsible for a take-off.

These effects are illustrated quantitatively.

We devise a generalized Directed Technical Change growth model in which firms spend resources in lobbying activity. As expected, the presence of lobbying distorts the skill premium and economic growth. Lobbying also contributes to a lower technological-knowledge bias toward the skill-sector and constitutes a possible explanation for the diverging empirical evidence on the relationship between the skill premium and the relative supply of skills. An increase in the relative lobbying power of the skilled intensive intermediate goods firms can lead to an increase or decrease in the skill premium, depending on the elasticity of substitution between the skilled and unskilled sectors. Lobbying also introduces possibility of a dual economy, with two different steady states, one characterized by low growth and another by high growth, depending on a threshold level of the lobbying power and on the elasticity of substitution. Quantitative exercises show that lobbying can indeed be quite important in distorting the skill premium and the economic growth.

We devise a North-South endogenous growth model with international trade and money to study the effects of inflation (and monetary policy) on wage inequality, specialization, and growth. The relationship between monetary policy and wage inequality depends on the fact that skilled-production firms are less credit constrained than unskilled-production firms. Interestingly, inflation affects the structure of production by increasing the production share made by skilled-intensive firms, and decreases economic growth. Furthermore, inflation decreases the difference of wage inequality between countries; shrinking the skill premia difference. Moreover, inflation and trade have opposite effects on wage inequality and on specialization: while trade tends to decrease intra-South wage inequality, inflation tends to increase it; while trade tends to increase the number of different intermediate goods produced with unskilled technology in the South; inflation acts the other way around. Results are confirmed quantitatively.

We analyze the effects of lobbying on growth and inequality in a novel directed technical change model, where firms producing different technologies can engage in either demand-seeking lobbying-aimed at increasing demand or rent-seeking lobbying-focused on extracting economic rents.

Demand-seeking lobbying promotes economic growth and, when goods are gross substitutes, also increases inequality. In contrast, rent-seeking lobbying has the opposite effects. We also develop a microfounded theoretical game that models generalized lobbying decisions. In this framework, firms from different sectors can either compete or collaborate in their lobbying efforts. The model reveals that lobbying incentives are stronger when fixed costs are low and when shared sources of lobbying efficiency outweigh sector-specific ones. Given our results, it is essential for policy to distinguish between rent-seeking and demand-seeking lobbying practices, and to design targeted incentives for each in order to effectively influence growth and inequality.